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Abstract
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, seeks to
promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s assets and the manner in which the
bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a minimum amount of funding
deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on the liquidity of the banks’ assets and
activities over a one-year timeframe. One of the areas seen as most affected by this
development may be bank participation in project finance for infrastructure development.
Since the global demand for infrastructure development remains robust, the shadow
banking system may emerge as a significant source of project finance. This case considers
whether the requirement that banks better match their assets and sources of funding is
affecting bank business models, what it means for the availability of credit, and whether
there are risks associated with the growing role of shadow banking in project finance.
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This module is one of seven produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) examining issues
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Basel III A: Regulatory History
Basel III B: Basel III Overview
Basel III C: Internal Risk Models
Basel III D: The Swiss Finish to Basel III
Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers
Basel III F: Callable Commercial Paper
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1. Introduction
Banks approached by corporate customers seeking long-term loans that will be difficult to
sell or use as collateral face a crucial dilemma. On the one hand, a bank could fund such loans
using short-term sources of financing that are lower cost but that may dry up in times of
economic uncertainty, potentially leaving the bank with a severe liquidity problem.
Alternatively, the bank could secure longer-term sources of financing at a higher cost to fund
such loans, eroding the bank’s profitability but affording it greater protection from a liquidity
standpoint.
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-09, many banks opted for the former approach, with
consequences that were ultimately disastrous. When short-term financing sources
effectively shut down during the early stages of the crisis, even some adequately capitalized
banks found themselves in dire straits because of liquidity concerns. Recognizing that the
financial crisis was thus a product not only of inadequate capital but also of inadequate
liquidity, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) for the first time added
minimum liquidity standards to the Basel framework as part of Basel III.
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), one of the two minimum liquidity standards
introduced by Basel III, seeks to promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s
assets and the manner in which the bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to
maintain a minimum amount of funding deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on
the liquidity characteristics of the banks’ assets and activities over a one-year timeframe.
The result is that banks engaging in long-term, illiquid lending must secure longer-term,
higher-cost sources of funding.
Although not scheduled to be fully implemented until 2018, the NSFR’s introduction may
have already begun to influence banks’ business practices. There has been some speculation
that banks are pulling back from business lines characterized by large loans that have
lengthy terms and are illiquid. One of the areas seen as most affected by this development
thus far has been project finance. Funding long-term infrastructure, industrial projects, and
public services such as power plants, telecommunications networks, and roads, project
finance by its very nature typically involves loans that are large, long-term, and illiquid.
Yet, despite the fact that banks may be restricting their involvement in project finance, the
global demand for infrastructure development remains robust. This may be contributing to
the emergence of other sources of funding for infrastructure development. Participants in
the shadow banking system—the pension funds, insurers, hedge funds, and other financial
institutions that comprise a financial system apart from the system of regulated banks—in
particular are becoming active in the project finance market. What this will mean for the
stability of the global economy remains to be seen, but some industry observers have raised
concerns about shadow banking’s growing role in project finance.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Net Stable Funding
Ratio (NSFR) introduced by the Basel III framework. Section 3 provides an overview of the
project finance industry. Section 4 outlines how the NSFR may be resulting in less
involvement in project finance by banks and how the shadow banking system has begun to
play a growing role in project finance, possibly to fill such a void. Section 4 then concludes
with some discussion of the implications of the growing role of shadow banking in project
finance.
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Questions
1. Is the requirement that banks better match their assets and sources of funding
affecting bank business models, and, if so, what does it mean for the availability of
credit?
2. Are there risks associated with the growing role of shadow banking in project
finance?

2. Net Stable Funding Ratio
Perhaps the most significant addition to the Basel framework made by Basel III has been the
introduction of minimum liquidity standards to complement the capital requirements that
have been the cornerstone of Basel from the outset. The introduction of these new standards
is a product of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) assessment of the
nature of the 2007-09 financial crisis. The BCBS has consistently described the crisis as one
not only of inadequate bank capital but also of inadequate bank liquidity, noting “[d]uring
the early liquidity phase of the financial crisis starting in 2007, many banks—despite
meeting the existing capital requirements—experienced difficulties because they did not
prudently manage their liquidity” (Bank for International Settlements 2014, 1). To promote
such prudent management, Basel III proposes two standards for liquidity that the BCBS
views as “designed to achieve two separate but complementary objectives” (Ibid., 1).
First, Basel III introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to ensure that banks can
survive a 30-day stress scenario by requiring them to maintain sufficient high-quality liquid
assets to meet expected outflows during such a scenario. (For a complete discussion of the
LCR and how its introduction has already begun to affect the commercial paper market, see
the YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 2014F.)
The second liquidity standard introduced by Basel III is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR),
which seeks “to reduce funding risk over a longer time horizon by requiring banks to fund
their activities with sufficiently stable sources of funding” (Bank for International
Settlements 2014, 2). Specifically, the NSFR is intended “[t]o promote more medium and
long-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations” to prevent the
reoccurrence of a balance sheet mismatch that created significant problems in 2007-09—
the use of short-term funding to back long-term assets and exposures (Bank for International
Settlements 2010, 25).
In order to achieve this, the NSFR evaluates a bank’s available amount of stable funding
(capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over a one-year timeframe) relative to its
required amount of stable funding (based on the liquidity characteristics and residual
maturities of the bank’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures). The NSFR mandates that
the ratio of available stable funding to required stable funding be at least 100% on an
ongoing basis. Thus, the less liquid and longer term a bank’s assets and exposures, the more
stable funding it will need to have available to it.
The first step in calculating a bank’s NSFR is to determine its amount of Available Stable
Funding (ASF). This measure is “based on broad characteristics of the relative stability of an
institution’s funding sources, including the contractual maturity of its liabilities and the
differences in the propensity of different types of funding providers to withdraw their
funding” (Bank for International Settlements 2014, 3). The bank must assign the carrying
value of all of its capital and liabilities to one of five different categories created by the BCBS
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to reflect differing degrees of maturity and likelihood of withdrawal. Each of these five
categories has a corresponding ASF factor that indicates the percentage of the capital and
liabilities in that category that may be included in the calculation of ASF. For example, the
first ASF category includes liabilities with residual maturities greater than one year. Given
that such liabilities are deemed completely stable for purposes of evaluating the stability of
funding sources over the one-year timeframe contemplated by the NSFR, this category has
an ASF factor of 100%. The full amount of all capital and liabilities assigned to this category
is therefore included in ASF. (See Figure 2.)
Figure 1: Basic NSFR Ratio

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2010, 25.

Figure 2: Summary of Liability Categories and Associated ASF Factors

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2010, 26.
After ASF has been determined, the bank must then follow a similar process to determine
the amount of required stable funding (RSF). The RSF measure is “based on the broad
characteristics of the liquidity risk profile of an institution’s assets and [off-balance sheet]
exposures” (Bank for International Settlements 2014, 6). The bank must assign each of its
assets to one of several categories created by the BCBS with corresponding RSF factors
“intended to approximate the amount of a particular asset that would have to be funded,
either because it will be rolled over, or because it could not be monetised through sale or
used as collateral in a secured borrowing transaction over the course of one year without
significant expense” (Ibid., 6). For example, the highly liquid assets included in the first three
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RSF categories receive RSF factors ranging from 0% to 15% reflecting the fact that the bank
could with relative ease sell or use the assets as collateral to raise funds within the one-year
NSFR timeframe. Assets at the opposite end of the spectrum, those that banks are completely
unable to sell or use as collateral during the one-year timeframe, receive an RSF factor of
100%. The carrying value of the assets assigned to each category is then multiplied by the
RSF factor and summed to determine the bank’s RSF. The complete set of RSF categories and
factors shown in Figure 3.
The categorization of a bank’s assets thus becomes extremely important under the NSFR,
with banks holding illiquid, long-term assets required to maintain higher levels of stable,
long-term funding. Given that such stable, long-term funding is typically costlier to banks
than is short-term funding, the NSFR creates an incentive for banks to avoid such illiquid,
long-term assets.
Figure 3: Summary of Asset Categories and Associated ASF Factors

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2010, 9.
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3. Project Finance Overview
As defined by the International Project Finance Association, project finance entails “[t]he
financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public services based upon a
non-recourse or limited-recourse financial structure where project debt and equity used to
finance the project are paid back from the cashflow generated by the project.” Given the scale
of the activities often being financed, the sums of money involved in this type of investing
are generally substantial. According to a 2014 piece in Project Finance magazine, the largest
project finance transaction in North America in 2012 occurred when Cheniere Energy
Partners, a Houston-based energy company, secured $3.6 billion in bank financing to fund
the first phase of construction at its Sabine Pass liquefied natural gas (LNG) export project
in Louisiana. This first phase involves the completion of two LNG “trains,” purification and
liquefaction plants that enable natural gas to be converted to its liquid form for shipping.
Upon completion, Sabine Pass will enable Cheniere to export LNG from the United States
around the globe. Already Cheniere has signed LNG delivery contracts with energy
companies in India, France, and Korea. Initial deliveries are scheduled to begin in late 2015.
A syndicate of leading global financial institutions including Société Générale, Credit Suisse,
HSBC, Morgan Stanley, and J.P. Morgan provided the $3.6 billion in bank financing for Sabine
Pass as part of the institutions’ project finance business lines.
Figure 4: Photo of Sabine Pass

Source: Project Finance 2014.
While many worried about the health of the project finance market in the aftermath of the
2007-09 financial crisis, the immediate picture has been bright. Global project finance
lending in 2010 totaled $167 billion, the second highest annual amount ever recorded
(KPMG 2010, 4). The resiliency of the project finance market is driven by robust demand for
infrastructure. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
estimated the global demand for infrastructure at $40 trillion over the next 20 years (Ibid.,
4). With many governments increasingly unable and/or unwilling to invest in infrastructure,
the project finance market provides a necessary source of funding to meet infrastructure
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needs. As a result, the project finance market has continued to grow. Project Finance
International estimates that in 2012, nearly $200 billion in global project finance loans were
made. (2013). Europe, the Middle East, and Africa was the most active region for project
finance deals at approximately $90 billion, with Asia (~$60 billion) and the Americas (~$50
billion) trailing (Standard & Poor’s Rating Services 2013, 2).
Yet if the project finance market as a whole has remained strong, there is some evidence that
banks may be in the process of pulling back. Given the size and sophistication of the
transactions involved, the market for project finance lending historically has been
dominated by leading banks. The list of the specific banks that have been most active in
project finance reflects the geographic distribution of the deals, with European and Asian
banks generally at the top of the league tables in recent years.
Although the NSFR is not scheduled to become a fully binding minimum standard until
January 1, 2018, banks may have begun to prepare for its implementation already by
restructuring or shifting away from lines of business involving long-term, illiquid lending.
Project finance, which, given the scale and sophistication of the activities being funded, can
commonly involve loan terms of up to 40 years, is one such business line that might be
affected by the impending implementation of the NSFR. Depending on the nature of the
specific loan, project finance assets would typically be allocated to one of the last RSF
categories with an RSF factor ranging from 65% to 100%. Given the size and duration of most
project finance loans, this means that banks would be required by the NSFR to maintain a
correspondingly large amount of ASF for a long period of time.

Figure 5: Top Project Finance Debt Providers 2013, First Quarter
Provider

HQ Country

Value
($millions)

Market Share
(%)

State Bank of India

India

2,326

6.3

Mitsubishi UFJ

Japan

1,391

3.7

Sumitomo Mitsui

Japan

1,101

3.0

ICICI Bank

India

1,092

2.9

UniCredit

Italy

1,048

2.8

Mizuho Financial

Japan

899

2.4

Lloyds Banking

United Kingdom

866

2.3

Barclays

United Kingdom

854

2.3

RBS

United Kingdom

755

2.0

Crédit Agricole

France

687

1.8

Source: Project Finance magazine 2014.
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There have been significant changes in the structuring of project finance transactions by
banks observed in the wake of the introduction of Basel III. There appears to be a clear link
between these changes and the added pressure that the NSFR will place on banks once fully
implemented. For example, in an interview with Bloomberg, French nuclear power plant
developer Areva SA asserted that increased borrowing costs charged by banks as a result of
Basel III have more than doubled the cost of completing nuclear power plant projects (de
Beaupuy 2013). To the extent that non-bank financial institutions are able to participate in
the project finance market without having to charge as much for financing, banks may play
a declining role in financing these types of projects.
In addition to evidence of increasing borrowing costs, it also appears that it has become
common for banks to impose terms intended to increase the transferability and reduce the
duration of project finance loans. One such development is the introduction of “mini-perm”
facilities, loans that assume a repayment of the debt through refinancing after a shorter
period of time (typically from five to seven years) (Shearman & Sterling 2014, 3). Indeed, the
2012 Sabine Pass transaction was a seven-year mini-perm deal. Here again, non-bank
financial institutions not facing regulatory pressures to structure transactions in this fashion
may enjoy an advantage over banks in the project finance market.

4. Shadow Banking’s Growing Role in Project Finance
Evidence of a shift in banks’ involvement in project finance is still preliminary and in need of
ongoing evaluation. However, what does seem clear is that shadow banking is playing an
increasingly important role in the sector. The question of whether this is a result of an
attempt to fill a void left by banks or of some other factors remains to be answered.
Shadow banking, defined by Standard & Poor’s Rating Services for purposes of its analysis of
alternative financing in infrastructure as “the system of finance that exists outside regulated
depositories, commercial banks, and publicly traded bonds,” consists of participants
including “pension funds, insurers, sovereign wealth funds, and export credit agencies,
alongside finance companies, private investment funds, business development corporations,
asset managers, hedge funds, and sponsored intermediaries such as money-market funds”
(2013, 3). Given that such institutions are not subject to the NSFR established by Basel III,
they do not face the same standards as do the banks that have historically dominated the
project finance.
There has been a recent significant increase in the role of shadow banking in project finance.
According to Standard & Poor’s, up to $25 billion of project finance debt may have come from
the shadow banking sector in 2013 (Ibid., 2). While potentially accounting for only about
12.5% of the total size of the project finance market, this is a source of project finance funding
that has emerged from almost nothing in just the past several years.
The growing role of shadow banking in project finance can be seen in the recent proliferation
of infrastructure debt funds and units established by insurers, hedge funds, and other
participants in the shadow banking system (Ibid., 4). The increasing involvement of the
shadow banking system in project finance is not occurring without generating concern in
some quarters. The relative lack of transparency associated with shadow banking
investments has led some industry observers to worry about the potential for the buildup of
systemic risk in the infrastructure sector (Ibid., 2). The fact that most shadow banking
participants lack the deep institutional knowledge of project finance possessed by many
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banks involved in the sector is an added concern for some, although the fact that hedge funds
and insurers entering the infrastructure debt market have often done so through external
hiring of individuals with industry knowledge may help address this fear.
The fact that shadow banking’s role in project finance is still new and relatively small makes
it difficult to predict what the eventual implications. However, questions already exist about
whether Basel III’s requirements have introduced more risk into the sector. In seeking to
require banks to fund long-term, illiquid loans with higher cost, longer-term sources of
funding, will the Basel framework push banks out of the project finance market? If so, will
shadow banking’s involvement grow enough to meet the continuing demand for
infrastructure investment? And what would such growth mean for economic stability?
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